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Exogenous attention to unseen objects? 
Abstract 
Attention and awareness are closely related phenomena, but recent evidence has 
shown that not all attended stimuli give rise to awareness. Controversy still remains over 
whether, and the extent to which, a dissociation between attention and awareness 
encompasses all forms of attention. For example, it has been suggested that attention 
without awareness is more readily demonstrated for voluntary, endogenous attention than 
its reflexive, exogenous counterpart.  Here we examine whether exogenous attentional 
cueing can have selective behavioural effects on stimuli that nevertheless remain unseen. 
Using a task in which object-based attention has been shown in the absence of awareness, 
we remove all possible contingencies between cues and target stimuli to ensure that any 
cueing effects must be under purely exogenous control, and find evidence of exogenous 
object-based attention without awareness. In a second experiment we address whether this 
dissociation crucially depends on the method used to establish that the objects indeed 
remain unseen. Specifically, to confirm that objects are unseen we adopt appropriate signal 
detection task procedures, including those that retain parity with the primary attentional 
task (by requiring participants to discriminate the two types of trial that are used to 
measure an effect of attention).  We show a significant object-based attention effect is 
apparent under conditions where the selected object indeed remains undetectable.  
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General Introduction 
Historically, visual attention and visual awareness have often been viewed as being 
so intimately related that they may be considered aspects of a single underlying process. It 
is now well established that this is not the case – attention and awareness dissociate under 
many conditions (McCormick, 1997; Kentridge, Heywood & Weiskrantz, 1999, 2004; 
Kentridge, Nijboer & Heywood, 2008; Bahrami, Carmel, Walsh, Rees & Lavie, 2008; Kanai, 
Tsuchiya & Verstraten, 2006).  There is some ambiguity, however, in classic experimental 
designs manipulating spatial attention (e.g. Posner, 1980) as to whether the unit of 
attentional selection is a region of space or the object that occupies that space (see e.g. 
Mole, 2008). One might be perfectly aware of attending to a spatial location even when 
stimuli appearing at that location remain unseen.  
This ambiguity is resolved in tests of object-based attention. In this form of attention 
the ‘object’ of selection is explicitly provided by the experimenter and it is easy to 
distinguish between effects that are purely spatial and those involving selection of the cued 
object.  For example, in the paradigm used by Egly, Driver & Rafal (1994) a visual transient 
directs subjects’ attention to one of two objects. The objects are arranged so that the effect 
of cueing can be compared for targets at two locations in the display. Both locations are the 
same distance from the cue but one target location is within the cued object (within-object 
location) whereas the other is encompassed by the uncued object (between-object 
location). The target within the cued object gains an attentional advantage over the target 
in the other object. This advantage cannot be the result of a simple spatial effect as both 
targets are equidistant from the cue and it is now well established that it is the object that is 
selected by attention in this paradigm (Reppa, Schmidt & Leek, 2012). If attention acts by 
selecting objects as a whole then all parts of the cued object should be attended. We 
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recently adapted the Egly et al paradigm and found that masked objects could act units of 
attentional selection and yet remain unseen (Norman, Heywood & Kentridge, 2013).   
There are, however, two forms in which attention can be directed to an object – 
endogenously and exogenously.  William James (1890) described the essential distinction 
between these two forms of attention: the first is voluntary whereas the second is reflexive .  
For endogenous attention, in behavioural experiments the cue typically takes the form of 
something symbolic (e.g. a centrally presented arrowhead), and the likelihood with which 
this stimulus correctly indicates an upcoming target’s location is varied.  At high likelihoods, 
an observer will benefit from and is therefore strongly encouraged to utilise the cue, 
whereas a neutral cue can be selectively ignored (Giordano, McElree & Carrasco, 2009).  For 
exogenous attention, typically a peripheral cue (i.e. a transient luminance flash) is shown 
before the target, which observers are unable to ignore even when it is of no informative 
value (Giordano et al, 2009).  Many qualitative and quantitative differences (e.g. Briand, 
1998; Lu & Dosher, 1998, 2000) support the distinction of purely endogenous and purely 
exogenous attention, the crux of which is that endogenous attention is under top-down 
control and is determined by learned associations, whereas exogenous attention is not - it is 
automatic and rapid.   
There remains some controversy over the generality of the dissociation of attention 
and awareness across these two forms of attention.  In particular, recent work by Chica and 
Bartolomeo (e.g. Chica, Lasaponara, Chanes, Valero-Cabré, Doricchi, Lupiáñez et al, 2011; 
Chica, Botta, Lupiáñez & Bartolomeo, 2012; Chica, Paz-Alonso, Valero-Cabre & Bartolomeo, 
2012) suggests that the coupling of attention and consciousness is much stronger when 
attention is under exogenous, as opposed to endogenous, control. That is, only when 
attention is captured automatically by external events (exogenously controlled), rather than 
4 
 
voluntarily directed by the observer (endogenously controlled), is it not sufficient for 
awareness. It is this latter form of attention, and the fronto-parietal network that underpins 
it anatomically, where Chica et al (Chica, Paz-Alonso et al, 2012) also show common 
engagement in attention and awareness. The question arises as to whether any stimulus 
selected reflexively in response to a visual transient necessarily enters awareness.  
Chica et al do not assume that stimuli attended under exogenous control inevitably 
elicit awareness. In a recent experiment (Chica, Botta et al, 2012) they have, however, 
shown that when both endogenous and exogenous attention produced behavioural effects 
in a reaction time task only exogenous attention produced a reliable change in conscious 
reports of the targets. Is there any evidence that targets that gain a measurable attentional 
advantage under exogenous control can remain unseen? There have been some 
demonstrations that exogenous attention can modulate the processing of unseen stimuli 
(Hsu, George, Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2011; Bahrami et al, 2008) and attention has been 
shown to be deployed to unseen stimuli in a feature-based manner, where visual targets are 
selected on the basis of a single attribute (e.g. colour or shape), in a manner that is rapid 
and not dependent on learning (Schmidt & Schmidt, 2010).  There is also some evidence 
from the neurological condition ‘blindsight’ that stimuli which gain a processing advantage 
as a consequence of attention guided by visual transients can, nevertheless, remain unseen 
(Kentridge et al, 1999). The cues in this study, although peripheral visual transients, were 
predictive of target locations and so attentional control was not necessarily exogenous. 
Nevertheless, in one experiment attention continued to be drawn to targets at the location 
of the cue for hundreds of trials even when the contingency between cue and target 
locations was negative (targets were more likely to appear at an uncued location at a rate of 
68.75%).  This is certainly indicative of exogenous control. Blindsight is a rare condition and 
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there is evidence for substantial cortical reorganisation in the patient who was the subject 
of this study, so general claims for dissociation between exogenous attention and 
awareness on this basis must be treated with caution. 
Both Marzouki, Grainger & Theeuwes (2007) and Van den Bussche, Hughes, Van 
Humbeeck & Reynvoet (2010) assessed the effect of exogenous attentional cues on the 
efficacy of masked primes in normal observers. In both studies there was no contingency 
between the location of cues and of primes (that is, cues were not predictive of prime 
location and so any attentional effect should be purely under exogenous control). Cueing 
significantly modulated the efficacy of primes indicating an effect of exogenous attention. In 
both studies it is, however, not clear whether the primes, despite being masked, were 
rendered completely invisible. In Marzouki et al (2007) there is good evidence that the 
identity of the primes was not discriminable but subjects’ ability to simply detect the 
presence of primes was not tested. In Van den Bussche et al (2010) a signal detection task 
testing discriminability of presence versus absence of primes showed overall significant but 
weak prime detectability (d’ = 0.17).  There was, however, considerable variation across 
observers both in prime detectability and in cueing effects. A regression of discriminability 
against attentional reaction time advantage (a Greenwald analysis, see e.g. Greenwald, 
Draine, & Abrams, 1996) showed that within this variability an attentional effect remained 
where primes were undetectable (at d’=0). The subset of observers in whom discriminability 
was at chance (d’<=0) still showed an effect of attention. One might, however, still exercise 
some caution about such post-hoc selection. So again, there is evidence suggestive of 
dissociation between exogenously controlled attentional selection and visual awareness but 
one that is not absolutely conclusive.  
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The aim in this paper is to assess whether an object selected on the basis of 
exogenously controlled attention can remain unseen in normal observers and yet influence 
behaviour. The paper is in two parts. In the first section we present evidence for just such a 
dissociation together with signal detection evidence that the selected objects remain 
unseen. In the second part of the paper we compare a number of approaches to 
constructing signal detection tasks that vary in terms of the comparability of these 
secondary tasks with the primary attentional task in terms of informational demands made 
on the subjects.  
 
Introduction Experiment 1 
The Egly et al object-based attention paradigm is often thought of as being mediated 
by purely exogenous attentional processes. This may not, however, be the case. Some types 
of attentional cue can elicit behavioural effects that are simultaneously suggestive of both 
endogenous and exogenous processing (e.g. eye gaze – Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Driver, 
Davis, Ricciardelli, Kidd, Maxwell & Baron-Cohen, 1999; McKee, Christie & Klein, 2007).  
Most importantly, when a peripheral cue (i.e. an ‘exogenous’ cue) predicts targets in 
locations remote from the cue itself, then facilitation can be seen in this region (Lambert, 
Naikar, McLachlan & Aitken, 1999).   As this involves the learning of a contingency to 
successfully interpret and use the cue it cannot be engaging purely exogenous attentional 
processes.  Indeed, some have argued for an entirely separate form of attention known as 
‘automated symbolic orienting’ to explain such instances (Ristic & Kingston, 2012).  The 
object-based attention in the classic Egly et al paradigm could potentially be controlled in 
this manner. 
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At first glance the Egly et al paradigm does not appear to include obvious 
contingencies between cue and target locations. The targets appearing at the two ‘between’ 
and ‘within’ object locations equidistant from the cue occur with equal probability (see 
Figure 1). There is, nevertheless, a contingency which might drive implicit learning of an 
object-based selection strategy.  In our version of the task (Norman et al, 2013) targets 
appeared at the within and between target locations on 25% of trials each and at the 
location of the cue itself on 50% of trials. Responses to the cued location do not form part of 
the test for object-based attention as there is an obvious confound between spatial- and 
object-selection for the target.  Nevertheless, the high reliability of the cue itself means that 
targets appear three times as often within the same object as the cue (50% valid plus 25% 
within object invalid conditions) as they do in the other object (25% between objects invalid 
condition).  This is typical of object-based attention task designs (in the original Egly et al 
task the split was 12.5%, 12.5%, 75%), but Lee, Kramer Mozer & Vecera (2012) manipulated 
cue-object contingency and showed that when the target appeared equally likely on the 
cued and non-cued object, thus nulling the contingency, participants were still faster at 
responding to targets in the cued object. In our earlier paper we took an alternative strategy 
that avoided this issue (making the locations of the objects themselves unpredictable). Here, 
in order to directly determine whether an object selected under exogenous attentional 
control can remain unseen yet influence behaviour, we modify our procedure in a manner 
akin to Lee et al (2012) so that there is no contingency between cue and target locations. 
We use four potential target locations, two within the cued object and two in the other 
object. Targets appear with equal likelihood at each location. 
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Figure 1 Illustration of the nature of the object-based contingency in the standard Egly et al (1994) 
design.  a. In the standard display two rectangles flank a fixation cross and on each trial a peripheral 
cue appears at one end of one of the rectangles (shown in the figure as C).  A target then follows in 
one of three locations – the same location as the cue (C), the opposite end of the same rectangle (W 
– for “within”) or the adjacent end of the opposite rectangle (B – for “between”).  The object-based 
attention effect is measured as the difference in reaction times to these latter two conditions (note 
that the arrows indicate that they are equated in terms of spatial distance from the cue).  b. With 
the standard design, however, the target appears more often on the object that is cued (the typical 
percentages of trials associated with each trial type are shown here, in which case the target falls on 
the cued object three times as often as the non-cued object – 75% compared to 25%). c. The design 
that we use in this study to eliminate this contingency includes a fourth target-location condition (D 
– for “diagonal”, in which the target appears on the opposite end of the opposite object) and 
presents an equal number of all four trial types. d. With our design it is clear that there is no such 
contingency, as the target falls on both the cued and non-cued object 50% of the time. 
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Experiment 1 – removing object-based contingencies  
Methods  
Participants 
Twenty naïve participants took part (16 female, 4 male; mean age = 20 years, SD = 
1.17), and all gave their written informed consent.  Participants were students recruited 
through the Durham University Psychology department’s participant pool scheme, and were 
awarded course credits for their participation. 
Materials 
Stimuli in all experiments were generated using a Cambridge Research Systems 
ViSaGe Graphics System and were presented on a gamma-corrected ViewSonic 17’’ display 
monitor viewed at a distance of 41cm (participants rested their head on a chin rest).  The 
background had a luminance of 50cdm-2.  The screen resolution was set to 1024 x 768 pixels 
with a refresh rate of 100Hz.  The ViSaGe Graphics System ensured that stimulus display and 
response timing were time-locked with the monitor’s refresh rate.  
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Figure 2 Illustrations of the stimuli in experiment 1; a simulated observer’s perception of 
those stimuli. a) Full illustration of the trial sequence of experiment 1.  Note that there are 
fewer Gabor patches used to produce the objects in the illustration than in the actual 
experimental stimuli.  Here the target (the red or green coloured disc) is invalidly cued 
between objects.  The cue is represented by the white disc.  Double arrows indicate that the 
two frames are presented continually in alternation at a frequency of 16.7 Hz.  b) A 
simulated observers perception of the sequence shown in figure a.  Participants are not 
aware of the presence of the figures.  
 
Procedure 
Participants fixated a central cross.  Following a warning tone, a lattice (21° in width 
and in height) centred on the fixation cross consisting of 18 x 18 uniformly positioned Gabor 
patches appeared.  Each Gabor had a diameter of 0.6° and a spatial frequency of 2.7 
cycles/degree and was separated from its neighbours by 0.6°.  Each Gabor had a maximum 
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contrast of 100% with a Gaussian standard deviation of 0.2°.  See figure 2 for illustrations of 
the stimuli and procedure. These Gabor patches were presented for 30ms, each with a 
randomly determined orientation, as a mask before the onset of the objects.  Immediately 
following this, the Gabors would continually alternate between vertical and horizontal 
orientations at 16.7Hz.  Two identical rectangular objects (measuring 12 x 3 Gabor patches 
and presented 2 Gabor patches either side of fixation) were formed by an orientation 
contrast of 90° to the background.  Thus, the objects were always defined by an orientation 
contrast of 90° to that of their background even as the orientations of all the Gabors in the 
display alternated.  In half the trials the pair of objects was vertical and in the other half was 
horizontal, and these trials were randomly interleaved. In four of the positions in the lattice, 
located 6 Gabor spaces vertically and horizontally in from the four corners, no Gabors were 
presented, as these locations served as placeholders for cues or targets. Thus, one 
placeholder was located at either end of both figures.   
Objects were presented for 1000ms, followed by a cue (white disc (luminance = 158 
cdm-2), 0.4° in diameter) which appeared for 160ms in one of the four placeholders 
(determined randomly with equal probability on each trial).  Following the offset of the cue, 
the target disc (0.4° in diameter) appeared in one of four locations, and was either red (CIE 
1931 x, y coordinates of 0.40, 0.31 with a luminance of 72 cdm-2) or green (CIE 1931 x, y 
coordinates of 0.30, 0.59 with a luminance of 81.06 cdm-2).  In valid trials (25% of all trials) 
the target appeared in the same position as the cue.  In invalid-within trials (25%) the target 
appeared in the adjacent placeholder that was within the same figure as the cue had been.  
In invalid-between trials (25%) the target appeared in the adjacent placeholder that was 
within a different figure.  In invalid-diagonal trials (25%) the target appeared in the 
diagonally opposite placeholder, therefore within a different figure as the cue.  The colour 
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of the target was determined randomly with equal probability on each trial.  Participants 
were instructed to indicate the colour of the target disc by pressing one of two buttons.  The 
target remained on the screen until a response was made, following which the noise mask 
of random orientations was presented again for a further 30ms, ending the trial.  See figure 
1 for a depiction of the display sequence and a simulation of the observers’ perception 
during the sequence, respectively.  
Participants completed one practice block followed by 4 test blocks of 96 trials. 
Following the completion of all sessions participants were asked a series of questions 
designed to probe awareness of the presence of figures in the display.  Participants then 
also completed a signal detection task in which they were required to explicitly detect the 
presence of the objects.  Participants completed two blocks, of 140 trials each, in which on 
each trial they were presented with the flickering background which contained the objects 
on half the trials.  These trials were randomly interleaved with those in which the 
background was completely uniform (i.e. all of the orientations in the display simultaneously 
alternated between horizontal and vertical).  For those trials in which the objects were 
present, there were an equal number of horizontal and vertical trials.  The display duration 
was automatically determined individually for each participant by obtaining their largest RT 
from the attention task following the removal of outliers (removal criteria described in full in 
the Results section), after which the stimuli were masked in the same manner as previously 
described.  The participant indicated with one of two buttons whether the objects were 
present or absent, and then rated their confidence of that judgment on a scale of 1-4. 
Results and discussion 
Data from one of the participants are not reported in any analyses because the 
goodness of fit for fitting parameters in the da estimation was significantly low (p=0.018).  
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Incorrect responses in the target-identification phase were excluded from analyses, and the 
remaining RTs were trimmed by first removing those that exceeded 1500ms or were less 
than 150ms, interpreted as unsuccessful button-presses or anticipatory response, and then 
excluding those that fell outside 2 standard deviations from the mean per condition per 
participant were removed as outliers.  This resulted in excluding 7.5% of trials.  A repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of cue validity on RT (F(3,54)=17.647, 
p<0.001), where the overall means were 414.1ms (valid), 426.5ms (invalid-within), 432.7ms 
(invalid-between) and 433.0ms (invalid-diagonal), as shown in figure 3.  In the key analysis, a 
paired t-test revealed that RTs were shorter on invalid-within than for invalid-between trials 
(t(18)=2.748, p=0.011), indicating a standard object-based attention effect. No significant 
effect of accuracy was found between the conditions of cue validity (F<1); this indicates no 
trade-off between RT and accuracy.   
Sensitivity was calculated by tabulating the number of responses for each of the 
eight confidence levels (4 ratings for both “present” and “absent” responses) for both 
“present” and “absent” trials.  The discriminability index da was calculated from these data 
using the software RScorePlus (Harvey, 2002) to fit a Gaussian unequal variance model.  da 
allows for unequal variance and is equivalent to d’ in the case of equal variance.  A higher da 
indicates a greater sensitivity to the target, and a da of zero indicates no sensitivity.  Overall, 
the average da was low (0.05, with average 95% confidence intervals of ±0.062), and it was 
not significantly above zero (t(18) = 1.84, p = 0.082), indicating that participants could not 
discriminate the signal (objects) from the noise (no objects). Receiver operating 
characteristics (ROCs) were also computed from the same data for each participant.  Each 
curve contains 7 points (as a scale of n criteria, in this case 8, determines n-1 points on the 
curve), with each representing a single criterion that distinguishes one rating from the 
14 
 
immediately lower rating (e.g. rating 4 from rating 3, or rating 8 from rating 7).  The ROC 
curves are plotted with true positive rate (hit rate) vs. false positive rate (false alarm rate) in 
figure 3; the more linear the plot, the less able the observer is to differentiate the two 
conditions.  As shown in figure 3, no participant showed any ability to maximise hit rate 
whilst minimising false alarm rate (as would be indicated by a bowed curve), indicating that 
they could not accurately distinguish the conditions that were driving the object-based 
attention effects in the previous task. 
Given that part of our conclusion results rests on accepting the null hypothesis (H0 – 
participants have no awareness of the objects) and rejecting the alternative hypothesis (H1 – 
participants have some awareness of the objects) based on a non-significant statistic, it is 
important to demonstrate that this non-significant finding is not simply the result of 
inconclusive data.  For the observed non-significant d’ value it is possible to perform a 
Bayesian model comparison and to calculate an index known as a Bayes factor which 
represents a ratio in the likelihoods of competing hypotheses.  This can be used to 
differentiate between data which is inconclusive and data which is positively in support of 
the null hypothesis.  Calculating a Bayes factor requires a specification of what each of the 
models (or hypotheses) predicts.  In this case, this involves comparing a model in which 
participants are not able to detect the objects (i.e. an average d’ of zero) to one in which 
they are able to detect the objects (i.e. a d’ score of some value above zero).  Given the 
uncertainty in the experimental literature concerning the nature of the relationship 
between d’ and subjective awareness (e.g. Vermeiren and Cleermans, 2012) it is difficult to 
conceive of the parameters of a theoretical model in which participants are aware of the 
objects. Nonetheless, we compared our H0 model with a model of H1 in which participants 
are able to detect the objects but with very low sensitivity (d’ is uniformly likely to fall 
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between 0.1 and 0.3). Following the guide of Dienes (2011), we performed a Bayesian 
model comparison based on these parameters and calculated a Bayes factor of 0.26.  The 
scale of the Bayes factor ranges from 0 (overwhelming support of H0), through 1 
(inconclusive), to infinity (overwhelming support of H1) and, as Jeffreys (1961) suggests that 
values less than one-third represent substantial support for H0, we are confident in 
concluding from our non-significant result that it was extremely unlikely that participants 
had any experience of the objects.  
Figure 3 also shows a scatterplot of points for each individual participant’s within-
object RT advantage (calculated from between-object RT – within-object RT) versus 
sensitivity (da).  A parametric correlation test between these two variables is not significant 
(r(18)=0.086, p=0.720), clearly indicating no association between the awareness of the 
objects and their effect on attention.  
This experiment demonstrates that object-based attention can occur in the absence 
of awareness.  Importantly, because there was no contingency between the cued-object and 
the location of the target, this was a purely exogenous from of object-based attention, as 
shown in Lee et al (2012).  This result, therefore, supports the position that the modulation 
of unconscious visual processing by attention is not limited to those forms of attention that 
are purely endogenous.  
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Figure 3: Results from both the attention task and signal-detection task from experiment 1. 
a) RT results from the attention task (N=19).  Participants were quicker to identify the colour 
of a target when it appeared within the same object as a preceding cue compared with 
when it appeared on a different object, whilst spatial distance was equated.  This is true 
despite participants denying any awareness of those objects and despite there being no 
contingency between the objects on which the cue and target appear.  Asterisk denotes a 
significant paired t-test at the 5% level.  Error bars show 1 standard error of the mean with 
between-participant variance omitted b) Average sensitivity (da) to the difference between 
within- and between-object trials.  This value is not statistically different from 0, indicating 
absence of awareness. c) Individual participants’ ROC.  All participants show an approximate 
linear plot indicating that they could not successfully maximise hit rate whilst minimising 
false alarm rate.  The lower right set of axes represents 4 of the total 19 participants’ ROC 
curves and the other three each represent 5. d) Scatterplot of each participant’s RT 
advantage (between-object RT - within-object RT) versus sensitivity.  There is no observable 
association between the participants’ ability to discriminate within-object trials from 
between-object trials and their difference in RT between the two conditions. 
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Introduction experiment 2 
The results of the previous experiment demonstrated that exogenous object-based 
attention can operate without awareness.  Such a conclusion, however, depends on the 
robustness of methods used to assess participant’s awareness in the signal-detection task.  
Appropriate means of assessing awareness requires consideration of a number of issues 
(Vermeiren & Cleeremans, 2012; Lin & Murray, 2014).  The validity of the sensitivity 
measurement (i.e. d’) is often restricted to the type of task used.  Some researchers 
rightfully argue for complete parity wherever possible between tasks that independently 
measure direct and indirect access to a cue (Reingold & Merikle, 1988).  In addition to taking 
such measures, however, Vermeiren and Cleeremans (2012) argue that the two tasks should 
only be considered equated when the distribution of attention in each task is the same. For 
example, observers are often instructed to discriminate some property of a stimulus in a 
signal detection task evaluating awareness when they had not been informed of the 
presence of this same stimulus in a preceding task measuring the effect of that stimulus on 
performance. In the awareness task observers will intentionally direct their attention to the 
stimulus in a way that they could not when its effect on performance was being measured. 
Perceptual sensitivity to the stimulus is likely to be overestimated in the awareness task. 
Similarly, the relevance criterion, or information criterion (Shanks & St John, 1994), states 
that an assessment of awareness is only suitable when it targets the specific information 
that determines a supposed non-conscious effect.  
In Norman et al (2013) we used the most straightforward measure of awareness – a 
test of participants’ ability to discriminate objects’ presence versus their absence.  The 
critical property that determines the unconscious attention effect, however, is the objects’ 
spatial location and orientation together with the relative positions of the cue and target on 
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each trial.  Even if participants are unable to discriminate the presence and absence of 
objects per se they might conceivably retain a conscious impression as to whether cues and 
targets appeared within a single object.  It could be argued, therefore, that in the signal 
detection task, participants should in fact be required to discriminate “within-object” from 
“between-object” trials, on the basis that this maximises the parity between the tasks 
measuring attention and awareness in terms of the critical aspect of the stimuli that drives 
the implicit effect. 
In the following experiment participants completed a standard Egly et al (1994) 
cueing task and the objects appeared at unpredictable locations and assumed unpredictable 
orientations on a given trial (as in Norman et al, 2013). Awareness was then assessed by first 
revealing to the participants the nature of the objects and requiring them to view the stimuli 
from the attention task a second time.  In this second phase, participants made a decision 
on each trial as to whether the cue and target appeared within a single object or in different 
objects in a confidence-rating signal-detection procedure.  This approach maintains parity of 
stimulus relevance as much as possible between the two tasks.  In order to allow accurate 
comparisons between the results from the following experiment and that used previously 
(Norman et al, 2013), we use the original three cueing conditions used in that experiment 
(valid, within- and between-object). 
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Experiment 2 – assessing awareness whilst maintaining parity of stimulus relevance 
between the attention and detection tasks  
Methods  
Participants 
Twenty naïve observers (12 female, 8 male; mean age = 20.4 years, SD = 1.01), were 
recruited, as in Experiment 1.   
Materials 
See previous experiment. 
Procedure 
The general methods remained the same as those in experiment 1; however, the 
objects were smaller and could occupy one of 4 potential positions on each trial and could 
be either vertically or horizontally oriented.   The background lattice was thus extended to 
consist of 22 x 22 Gabor patches (diameter of 0.4° and spatial frequency of 3.75 
cycles/degree) and contained 16 cue/target placeholders distributed in a 4 x 4 arrangement 
centred on the fixation cross with each one separated by 4 Gabors from its neighbours 
(vertically and horizontally).  16 placeholders were included across the display, instead of 4, 
such that the objects could be placed at a number of potential locations across the display.  
Specifically, 4 locations were used in which the objects could be defined: above, below, left 
or right of fixation.  The figures measured 8 x 3 Gabor patches separated from one another 
by 2 Gabor spaces.  See figure 3 for an illustration of the stimuli.  The location of the pair of 
figures would be randomly determined with equal probability on each trial.  Three target 
locations were used; valid (50% of trials), invalid-within (25%) and invalid-between (25%). 
The temporal sequence of the experiment was identical to that of the first (and that 
reported in Norman et al, 2013).  
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There were four potential object locations: one placeholder was located at each end 
of both figures and the spatial distance between these placeholders was equated.  For each 
block of trials, the objects were presented an equal number of times vertically and 
horizontally and the order of this was randomised within each block.  On each trial, the 
location of the objects was determined randomly with equal probability.   See figure 4 (a 
and b) for a depiction of the display sequence and a simulation of the observers’ perception 
during the sequence, respectively.  Figure 4c also shows examples of the different positions 
and orientations which the objects could assume.  
Participants completed 10 practice trials followed by three blocks of 120 
experimental trials.  Participants were then asked an open question to probe their visual 
experience of the stimuli: they were asked to describe anything they noticed about the 
flickering background on which the white flash (cue) and coloured disc (target) were 
presented.  After answering the question, participants were then shown the display with a 
much reduced alternation rate of 4 Hz which explicitly revealed the nature of the objects in 
the display.  
The second phase of the experiment determined whether participants could identify 
“within-object” trials from “between-object” trials in a confidence-rating signal-detection 
procedure.  Participants were presented with an additional 3 blocks of 120 trials, preceded 
by 10 practice trials, each containing the same proportion of valid, invalid-within and 
invalid-between trials, and the same number of horizontally and vertically presented objects 
as in the previous attention task.  Other randomly-determined parameters (e.g. object 
position and orientation) and temporal characteristics remained consistent with the 
attention task.  The display duration was set according to the same procedure as the 
previous experiment.  Participants had to indicate on which trials the cue and target 
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appeared in the same object or in different objects by pressing one of two keys, and then to 
rate their confidence with that judgment on a scale of 1-4, by pressing one of four keys. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Illustrations of the stimuli and the temporal sequence of experiment 2; a simulated 
observer’s perception of those events; and three examples of the different object positions 
and orientations.  a) Full illustration of the trial sequence.  Note that each box only shows a 
magnified portion of the entire stimulus display, focussed on the objects.  Here the objects 
appear below the fixation cross in a vertically-aligned arrangement and the target is invalidly 
cued within those objects.  Double arrows indicate that the two frames are presented 
continually in alternation at a frequency of 16.7 Hz.  In the signal-detection task, the final 
two frames (target frames) were only presented for a limited amount of time that was 
calibrated for each participant (see Methods) b) A simulated observers perception of the 
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sequence shown in a.  Participants are not aware of the presence of the figures. c) Examples 
of the three object positions not shown in a; relative to the fixation cross, they are left, 
above and right.  The cue and target on each trial would only be presented within the 4 
placeholders associated with the figures. 
 
Results and discussion 
RTs were trimmed using the same methods as in the previous experiment.  Overall, 
8.6% of all trials were discarded using these methods.  A within-participant ANOVA with the 
single factor Cue Validity was conducted on the mean values of the remaining RTs, with 
overall means of 421.5ms (valid), 440.1ms (invalid-within) and 446.9ms (invalid-between) as 
shown in figure 5a. The main effect was significant (F(2,38)=28.99, p<0.001) indicating that 
the cue had a different effect on participants’ RTs depending on its position relative to the 
target and the figures.  In the key analysis, a paired t-test revealed that RTs were shorter on 
invalid-within than for invalid-between trials (t(19)= 2.24, p=0.037), indicating that 
participants were faster to respond to targets that appeared within the same object as the 
preceding cue relative to those that appeared on a different object.  No significant effect of 
accuracy (valid: 96.3%, invalid-within: 96.1%, and invalid-between: 96.8%) was found 
between the conditions of cue validity (F(2,38)=0.45, p=0.639),  indicating no trade-off 
between RT and accuracy. 
Data from the subsequent signal-detection task were used to formally measure 
participants’ sensitivity to the objects.  The task measured participants’ ability to distinguish 
two categories of trial (“within-object” and “between-object”) that each occurred an equal 
number of times.  For the purposes of signal-detection, this is analogous to a yes/no design, 
in which “between-object” trials are treated as “signal-present” and “within-object” trials 
are treated as “signal-absent (noise)”.  With this design, sensitivity (da) was calculated in the 
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same way as in the previous experiment.  Overall, participants’ da (shown in figure 5) did not 
differ significantly from zero (mean da = 0.01, with average confidence intervals of ±0.035; 
t(19) = 0.32, p = 0.75), indicating that participants could not discriminate the two conditions 
of within-object and between-object trials, and hence it is extremely unlikely that they had 
any awareness of the objects.  The ROC curves are plotted in figure 5 and, as shown, no 
participant showed any ability to maximise hit rate whilst minimising false alarm rate (as 
would be indicated by a bowed curve), indicating that they could not accurately distinguish 
the conditions that were driving the object-based attention effects in the previous task.  We 
performed the same Bayesian model comparison as in experiment one and calculated a 
Bayes factor of 0.01, which again is in support of the hypothesis that participants had no 
awareness of the objects.   
Figure 5 also shows a scatterplot of points for each individual participant’s within-
object RT advantage (calculated from between-object RT – within-object RT) versus 
sensitivity (da).  A parametric correlation test between these two variables is not significant 
(r(18)=-0.019, p=0.935), clearly indicating no association between the awareness of the 
objects and their effect on attention.  
The results from this experiment show that when parity is optimised between the 
separate tasks measuring attention and awareness then the dissociation between object-
based attention and object awareness still holds.  This strongly suggests that the nature of 
the task given to participants in the signal detection phase of the experiment is unlikely to 
account for the dissociation between attentional effects on performance and  measured 
awareness.   
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Figure 5: Results from both the attention task and signal-detection task from experiment 2. 
a) RT results from the attention task (N=20).  Participants were quicker to identify the colour 
of a target when it appeared within the same object as a preceding cue compared with 
when it appeared on a different object, whilst spatial distance was equated.  This is true 
despite participants denying any awareness of those objects.  Asterisk denotes a significant 
paired t-test at the 5% level.  Error bars show 1 standard error of the mean with between-
participant variance omitted b) Average sensitivity (da) to the difference between within- 
and between-object trials.  This value is not statistically different from 0, indicating absence 
of awareness. c) Individual participants’ ROC.  All participants show an approximate linear 
plot indicating that they could not successfully maximise hit rate whilst minimising false 
alarm rate.  Each set of axes represents 5 of the total 20 participants’ ROC curves. d) 
Scatterplot of each participant’s RT advantage (between-object RT - within-object RT) versus 
sensitivity.  There is no observable association between the participants’ ability to 
discriminate within-object trials from between-object trials and their difference in RT 
between the two conditions. 
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General discussion 
In the first of two experiments we have shown that a truly exogenous form of object-
based attention can operate in the absence of awareness.  As is typical of many object-
based attention tasks, in the version showing object-based attention without awareness 
reported previously (Norman et al, 2013) targets appeared on the cued object more often 
than on the non-cued object due to the inclusion of the “valid” cue condition along with the 
critical “within” and “between” conditions.  The consequence of this setup, however, is an 
object-based contingency (targets appeared more often on the cued object) that means that 
no conclusion can be drawn as to whether the unseen objects was selected on a purely 
exogenous basis.  In experiment 1, following Lee et al (2012), we removed this contingency 
and found that object-based attention (i.e. in the exogenous form it is typically assumed to 
operate – e.g. see de-Wit, Cole, Kentridge, & Milner, 2011) was present for objects that did 
not enter participants’ awareness. 
The work of Chica and Bartolomeo discussed earlier demonstrate clearly  that 
exogenous attention is a major factor in determining what enters the contents of awareness 
(e.g. Chica, Paz-Alonso et al, 2012), but the results of experiment 1 in the present study 
demonstrate that stimuli selected by attention in an exogenous manner do not necessarily 
enter awareness.  This is in agreement with others that have previously shown some 
indication that exogenous attention in the absence of awareness might be possible (e.g. 
Marzouki et al, 2007; Van den Bussche et al, 2010). 
Experiment 1 was successful in controlling for object-based contingencies and 
showing that a purely exogenous form of object-based attention can operate without the 
objects entering awareness.  The motivation for conducting this experiment  was driven by 
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the possibility that subjects might learn about contingencies in the standard object-based 
attention paradigm despite their lack of awareness.  Two lines of evidence suggest that this 
is a genuine concern. First, it is known, however, that conscious object-based attention can 
be modulated by the presence of competing spatial contingencies (Lee et al, 2012; Yeari & 
Goldsmith, 2010) and that contingencies can be learned surprisingly rapidly (e.g. 
Kristjánsson, Mackeben, & Nakayama, 2001). Second, such contingencies can be learned 
and effect deployment of attention without subjects becoming aware of them (e.g. Lambert 
& Sumich, 1996) or even being aware of the stimuli they are learning about (e.g. Lambert, 
Naikar, MacLachlan & Aiken, 1999).   
The second experiment of this study examines the consequences of using a task in 
the signal detection phase of an experiment on object-based attention without awareness 
that most closely matches the attentional task in terms of the information that determines 
performance.  In Norman et al (2013) we reported results based ona test of participants’ 
ability to discriminate objects’ presence versus their absence. Given that the critical 
property that determines the unconscious attention effect is the positions of the cue and 
target relative to the object on each trial, this is not the task with the most parity.  
Experiment 2, therefore, replicated the procedure of Norman et al (2013) but with the 
modification of requiring participants to discriminate “within-object” from “between-
object” trials and found no evidence that participants were able to perform in this version of 
the signal detection task above chance.  This experiment, together with that reported in 
Norman et al (2013), demonstrates that for the stimuli used in this design the dissociations 
previously obtained between attention and awareness could  not be accounted by the 
nature of the signal detection tasks used to measure awareness.   
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It is important to address the possibility that the within-object advantage does not 
necessarily reflect the encoding of an object representation by the visual system.  Instead, it 
is possible that the preattentive segmentation of the visual scene based on feature 
contrasts may result in attention being constrained by the contours of an object in a purely 
spatial manner.  The results of Naber, Carlson, Verstraten & Einhäuser (2011), however, 
show that the perceptual benefits that are typically assumed to be associated with 
objecthood (i.e. object-based attention) are not the result of such low-level feature-based 
representations, but of a representation of an object as a “unique representational entity” 
(Naber et al, 2011, p.6).  In the stimuli of their experiment, the percept changed 
spontaneously between that of a bound object and that of an unbound constellation of 
features, despite no physical changes in the stimulus.  Only when the bound object was 
perceived was there an object-based facilitation effect at and within the object’s borders.  
The presence of an “object-based attention effect”, therefore, may be taken as an 
implication of the encoding of an object representation (i.e. a distinct and single perceptual 
entity that is not restricted to a spatial reference frame).  In conclusion, it is clear that 
attention can be used to select stimuli that remain unseen.  The two experiments reported 
here advance our understanding of this dissociation first by showing that object selected 
under purely exogenous control do not necessarily enter awareness and second by showing 
that such results are not merely a consequence of the nature of the task used in measuring 
awareness.  
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